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Abstract 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, American exceptionalism and militarism have been 
ascendant, often resulting in a government that is eager and able to engage in military 
interventions across the world. This reality has been upheld by a strong bipartisan consensus of 
liberal internationalists and neoconservatives that, while it often disagreed on means, ultimately 
shared the same worldview. However, a number of recent global and national trends have led to 
growing voices on both sides of the aisle—progressives on the left, and populists on the 
right—to question the assumptions driving this consensus. This growing coalition has 
convergence on means—military withdrawal from the world—but have divergent worldviews. 
This paper explored the Presidencies of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W 
Bush, and Barack Obama to help define the post-Cold War consensus. Then, it seeks to explore 
whether these new realities have offered an opportunity for true re-thinking of American foreign 
policy and to understand whether a coalition built upon an agreement on means, as opposed to 
worldview, can be successful. The paper concludes that while the political conditions indicate 
that the country is ripe for a re-thinking, there are still questions to be addressed before a 
non-interventionist foreign policy can take hold.  
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Section A: Introduction 
I: Introduction 
On December 13, 2018, the United States Senate voted 56-41 to pass Senate Joint              
Resolution 54, which called “to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from              
hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.” The passage of                1
this bill was historic for two reasons. First, it marked the first use of the War Powers Act of                   
1973, which was intended to curb the president’s power in making foreign policy decisions. The               
second reason that the passage of this bill was notable was because of its co-sponsors.  
The bill’s lead sponsor was Senator Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont who             
is arguably the body’s most progressive member. One of the original co-sponsors, and one of               
two Senators to accompany Sanders to the press conference that followed the vote was Mike               
Lee, a Republican from Utah who has consistently been rated as one of the Senators with the                 
most conservative voting records. The bill passed with 47 votes from Democrats and seven from               
Republicans, which is no small feat in today’s partisan political world. 
Bipartisanship when it comes to US foreign policy is hardly a new phenomenon.             
Historically, it has been one of the few policy areas in which both parties have found room for                  
agreement. For decades, the “establishment” of both parties espoused similar goals: Maintaining            
1 U.S. Congress, Senate, ​A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in 
the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress​, S.J. Res 54, 115th Cong., introduced in Senate 
February 28, 2018, ​https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/54​.  
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America’s role on the global stage, preserving relationships with allies and partners, spreading             
democracy, and protecting human rights around the world. Although the means to accomplish             
these goals sometimes differed—Democrats tended more towards diplomacy and working with           
international organizations and coalitions while Republicans tended more towards military          
strength and unilateralism—there was seemingly more consensus on what the goal of US foreign              
policy should be than there was on any other issue. Even in an age of growing polarization and                  
partisanship in the United States, agreements on the major questions of foreign policy, such as               
the desire for openness, an instinct towards intervention, and the view of America as the central                
entity in this globalized world, seem to be points of agreement between the two parties.  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left the United States as                   
the world’s sole hegemon, American foreign policy, particularly in the Executive Branch has             
been dominated by a combination of neoconservatives and liberal internationalists who have            
embraced American exceptionalism, ostensibly viewed it as their nation’s responsibility to           
protect oppressed populations around the world, promoted a theory of globalism and openness,             
and used the military apparatus at their disposal to accomplish these goals. Each of four               
successive post-Cold War presidents, two from the Republican Party (George H.W. Bush and             
George W. Bush) and two Democrats (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) mostly made foreign              
policy decisions constrained by these assumptions. These presidents rhetorically emphasized the           
United States’ position as the international guarantor of freedom and pushed for a world in which                
liberal democratic capitalism was the norm and freedom of movement, open markets, and free              
trade existed everywhere. 
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This vote on the Yemen bill presented a glimpse at a new possibility: A world in which                 
Democrats and Republicans could form a bipartisan coalition that would combat the            
generations-long militarization of American foreign policy, halt the automatic instinct towards           
intervention, and reshape the way that Americans understood their role in the world. This new               
coalition would represent almost the mirror opposite of its predecessor: A bipartisan coalition             
formed by minority voices within each party—anti-war progressives on the left, and a             
combination of libertarians and a resurgent populist wing on the right—that agrees on means, but               
ultimately shares a different worldview. Generally speaking, the anti-war left would like to see              
American foreign policy reoriented towards diplomacy and increased, consistent concern for           
human rights while the libertarian and populist right believe that the United States’ endless wars               
have cost the United States too much, both in terms of money and lives and would prefer to see                   
America turn inward, but both seek to accomplish their respective goals by halting America’s              
global overreach and reducing its military footprint. 
The Democratic Party has long had an anti-war contingent in its party, but in the modern                
era, it has yet to manifest itself into a powerful entity when it comes to crafting policy. Even                  
President Obama, who ran on an anti-interventionist platform, embraced neoliberal ideals and            
eventually failed to implement the vision he articulated when it came to America’s role in the                
world. Further, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-war left has clear examples of when                 
the attempted spread of liberal democratic ideals can go catastrophically wrong. The traditional             
anti-war element of the party has been joined by a number of new progressive Democrats who                
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have argued, in part, that bloated military budgets have drawn funds away from important              
economic and social projects at home.  
On the right, non-interventionist foreign policy was long seen as a fringe view, only              
present in libertarian wing of the party. For the most part, the Republican Party has been                
supportive of the United States flexing its military might. However, part of the new, rising               
populist tide on the American right has expressed serious concern about increased globalization.             
Part of this push against globalization has been an opposition to wars which right-wing              
nationalists see as a waste of resources. While this worldview is possibly nationalism masked in               
anti-interventionism and more isolationist than anti-war, it does present a sliver of an opening for               
an overlap between these two constituencies.  
This overlap suggests that consensus created by neoconservatives and liberal          
internationalists may be slowly eroding. There are domestic political conditions that offer a             
chance at redefining the way the American government thinks about the country’s place in the               
world. However, in order to truly re-imagine American foreign policy, a left/right coalition             
cannot only change rhetoric or alter the calculations of decision-makers, but must also overturn              
some entrenched realities that have made militarization a foundational part of American foreign             
policy.  
These realities include the military “iron triangle” or the powerful relationship between            
the military, defense industry, and the US Congress, otherwise known as the military-industrial             
complex; the immediacy of results and apparent ease—buoyed by Congress’ consistently bloated            
funding of the Department of Defense—of military deployment relative to diplomacy; and the             
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lack of a consistent vision since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of a commitment to                   
protecting American interests. These entrenched realities are formed at the intersection of            
Congress, the Pentagon and the military, private defense contractors, and the decision-makers in             
the Executive Branch.  
Politicians have occasionally expressed dissatisfaction with the foreign policy status quo           
in the past. These have typically played out during campaign season, when disagreements are              
often exaggerated and when an opposing party occupies the presidency. They therefore have             
been used more as political attacks than they have been motivated by a true desire to overturn the                  
status quo. Even after past foreign policy failures, such as in Vietnam, the opposition to               
intervention was not sustainable because of the impulse towards intervention, the military            
industrial complex, and the lack of the clear advocacy of an alternative vision. However, some               
fairly significant recent events, notably the passage of the Yemen bill and the founding of the                
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, funded primarily by liberal mega donor George            
Soros and the conservative billionaire Charles Koch, have made the idea of such a coalition seem                
plausible. The following pages will seek to explore whether these small steps could transform              
into something larger, what the coalition might look like, and which potential roadblocks may              
stand in its way.  
The paper will begin with some historical background information on the militarization            
of American foreign policy and the instinct towards military intervention, as well the political              
dynamics that permitted the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy that has ruled since the              
conclusion of the Cold War. Following this historical perspective will come more direct analysis              
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of what the future may look like. First, it will examine examples of this non-interventionist               
alliance and what made them possible. Then, the paper will look to answer the central question.                
The prevailing post-Cold War consensus broadly agrees on goals, yet it has tended to differ on                
means, whereas the emerging coalition agrees on means even as it disagrees on the ultimate goal.                
Given this, can such a coalition put together a new, coherent alternative vision of American               
statesmanship, under what conditions, and what might such a  vision look like? 
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Section B: Background  
II: The Indispensable Nation: American Exceptionalism, Militarism, and Intervention  
The story of the interventionist nature of the United States can be told at the nexus of the                  
idea of American exceptionalism and the rapid militarization of US foreign policy. These two              
phenomena built off of each other to create a state whose military was far more powerful than                 
any other country’s and a relatively stronger and more flexible tool than any other in the                
American foreign policy toolkit.  
The bipolar structure of the Cold War era gave the United States a sense of stability, a                 
clear enemy, and a clear goal when it came to foreign affairs. However, according to the                
academic Andrew Bacevich, in his book ​The Age of Illusions: How American Squandered Its              
Cold War Victory​, “as the Soviet Union passed out of existence, Americans were left not just                
without that enemy but without even a framework for understanding the world and their place in                
it.” The fall of the Soviet Union might have conceivably presented an opening, absent the threat                2
of communism, for the United States to retreat from the world. Instead, it led to the unhindered                 
actualization of a powerful, long-lasting form of American exceptionalism, one that permitted            
the United States to pursue its destiny without any obstacle in its way. As the world’s new                 3
leading power, the United States began to exert military and economic power even more              
forcefully than it had in the preceding half-century. As former National Security Advisor Brent              
2 ​Andrew Bacevich, ​The Age of Illusions: How American Squandered Its Cold War Victory​, (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2020), 2.  
3 Andrew Bacevich, “The Age of Illusions,” Speech, Politics and Prose, Washington, D.C., January 27, 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUd4jOszwd8​.  
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Scowcroft later put it, the United States at the start of the 1990s found itself “standing alone at                  
the height of power” with “the rarest opportunity to shape the world and the deepest               
responsibility to do so wisely for the benefit of not just the United States, but of all nations.”   4
Prominent journalists and academics at the time joined in agreeing that the United States’              
victory in the ideological battle with the Soviet Union meant that liberal democratic ideals were               
ascendant and that the rest of the world would soon follow America’s lead. Writing for ​Foreign                
Affairs in 1990​, ​columnist Charles Krauthammer declared “The immediate post-Cold War world            
is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the                
United States, attended by its Western allies,” arguing that this preeminence was based on the               
fact that the United States was uniquely situated militarily, politically, and economically to be a               
major player in any international conflict at any time, and stating that the only factor that might                 
interrupt a period of “three or four decades” of US superiority would be not overreach abroad,                
but an economic decline caused by wasteful spending at home. The political scientist Francis              5
Fukuyama would famously write in 1989 that the world had reached “The End of History” and                
that democratic capitalism’s triumph over authoritarian communism meant that there would be            
“no struggle or conflict over ‘large’ issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen;               
what remains is primarily economic activity.”   6
Though the post-Cold War American presidents agreed that liberal democratic ideals           
were ascendant, if not inevitable, in their eyes, the process to liberation would not be a passive                 
4  ​George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, ​A World Transformed​, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 564. 
5  ​Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” ​Foreign Affairs​ (1990), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment​.  
6 ​Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” ​The National Interest​, (1989): 5, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents​.  
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one. If this unstoppable progress toward worldwide liberation did not go smoothly, the United              
States would be willing to deploy its dominant military to push back against challenges to liberal                
democracy. As Stephen Walt explains it in his book ​The Hell of Good Intentions: America's               
Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy​, “Having won the Cold War, (...) US                
leaders now set out to create a liberal world order through the active use of US power. Instead of                   
defending its own shores, maximizing prosperity and well-being at home, and promoting its             
ideals by force of example, Washington sought to remake other countries in its own image and                
incorporate them into institutions and arrangements of its own design.”   7
In the decade that followed the Cold War, the United States intervened in conflicts in               
which there were not even nominal challenges to American security. Instead, the justifications             
for the interventions in the Gulf, Somalia, and the Balkans relied on the United States’               
responsibility to uphold human rights, to protect citizens from the violence of oppressive regimes              
and to demonstrate American commitment to post-Cold War alliances. The outcomes of these             
initial post-Cold War interventions ranged from apparently quick victory in the first Gulf War, to               
a protracted, bloody but ultimately successful involvement in the Balkans to a catastrophic             
failure in Somalia. These military missions proved that American hegemony on the world stage              
would go virtually unchallenged. 
While under Bush 41 and Clinton globalism was the general guideline for international             
politics, when Bush 43 took office, American militarism took on a life of its own. While military                 
operations under his two predecessors had typically been more contained, under Bush war was,              
7 ​Stephen M. Walt, ​The Hell of Good Intentions, America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy​, 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 23.  
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according to Bacevich, “a sort of complement to globalization—another approach to bringing the             
world into conformity with American preferences.” Prior to Bush, the experiences in Somalia             8
and elsewhere had made direct military conflict an undesirable course. Instead, the United States              
relied primarily on long-range weapons to fight adversaries from a distance, and on training local               
militaries to do the fighting on the ground behalf of the United States. Following 9/11, however,                9
the United States engaged in conflicts that lasted well beyond their original scope: In Iraq as in                 
Afghanistan, the United States didn’t withdraw once it captured and assassinated Saddam            
Hussein or drove the Taliban from power, but the military instead stayed in order to rebuild Iraqi                 
and Afghan societies in the U.S.’s own image; from then on the concept of “endless wars”                
entered the American lexicon.  
Accompanying this trend toward intervention was the rapid militarization of the           
American foreign policy apparatus. The American government has increasingly turned to the            
Pentagon to provide services beyond what it would typically do. An example is the 2013               
initiative by the Chief of Staff of the Army Raymond Odierno, known as Regional Allied Forces                
(RAF), which, according to former Department of Defense official Rosa Brooks is an “effort to               
take a large, clumsy, industrial behemoth and turn it into an agile, regionally engaged, globally               
responsive and culturally sophisticated force—one that’s more Mao than Bismarck and more            
T.E. Lawrence than George Patton.” This initiative attempts to diversify the ability of the              10
military to be not only a combatant force, but a cultural, diplomatic, and legal one, as well. It                  
8 ​Bacevich, ​The Age of Illusions​, 108. 
9 ​For more on the United States’ desire to fight war at a distance between the end of the Cold War and the second 
Iraq War, see Bacevich, ​American Empire, Chapter 6: Gunboats and Gurkahs​.  
10 ​Rosa Brooks: ​How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon​, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 145.  
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would, as a result, expand America’s reach and strengthen its grip on the rest of the world in                  
these areas.  
In a more tangible sense, turning to the Department of Defense has increasingly become              
the only financially viable option for dealing with foreign affairs. As of 2019, DOD’s budget is                
$1.1 trillion; compared to $40.7 billion for the State Department. This discrepancy in funding              
leads to a vicious cycle. As Brooks explains, “As budget cuts cripple civilian agencies and               
programs, they lose their ability to perform as they once did, so we look to the military to pick up                    
the slack, further expanding its role in both foreign and domestic activities and further straining               
the volunteer force. This requires still higher military budgets, which continues the devastating             
cycle.” Campaign funding and other political interests mean that Congress consistently           11
provides the Defense Department with large budgets. Foreign policy decision-makers in the            
executive branch interpret this relatively large budget as indicative of the military’s capabilities,             
and therefore often engage the military in operations that it is not intended to, nor indeed capable                 
of, performing. The military budget, along with many interventionist policies, have consistently            
had bipartisan support in Congress and among presidents from both parties.   12
Furthermore, the Department of Defense (and the federal government more generally) is            
littered with former executives from powerful defense industries, and vice versa (the so-called             
“revolving door”). A report from The Project on Government Oversight found that “There were              
645 instances of the top 20 defense contractors in fiscal year 2016 hiring former senior               
government officials, military officers, Members of Congress, and senior legislative staff as            
11 ​Ibid., 21.  
12 ​The bipartisan nature of these pursuits is explored in more detail in Chapter III. 
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lobbyists, board members, or senior executives in 2018.” According to the report, having a              13
number of important decision makers rotating between DOD, the military, and top military             
contractors “often confuses what is in the best financial interests of defense            
contractors—excessively large Pentagon budgets, endless wars, and overpriced weapon         
systems—with what is in the best interest of military effectiveness and protecting citizens.”             14
Once again, this dynamic means that the military can find itself overstretched by decisions made               
in the executive branch and by important lobbying groups. As the United States’ perception of its                
worldwide standing has changed, it has engaged in missions that none of its civilian or military                
agencies are equipped to undertake, including nation-building and regime change operations, and            
the executive has impulsively deployed its most well-funded asset to handle these duties.  
Technological advancements have also intensified the militarization of foreign policy by           
making war easier to wage and reducing the costs of using lethal force for the United States. The                  
concept of trying to kill combatants from a safe distance has been around as long as war itself.                  
Drones are simply the latest iteration of such a weapon and are more effective, more efficient,                
and cheaper than their predecessors. Although the first strike in America’s “drone war” took              
place in 2002, drones became an especially prominent weapon under Presidents Obama, who             
expanded the kill lists of potential drone targets and began to use them in countries that were not                  
necessarily covered by the AUMF, such as Yemen and Somalia.   15
13 ​ Mandy Smithberger, “Brass Parachutes: The Problem of the Pentagon Revolving Door,”, ​Project On Government 
Oversight, ​November 5, 2018, ​https://www.pogo.org/report/2018/11/brass-parachutes/​.  
14 Ibid. 
15 ​For more on drone warfare in the Obama administration, see Brooks, ​How Everything Became War and the 
Military Became Everything,​ ​Chapter 5: The Secret War. 
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These factors—the strong belief in American exceptionalism, bipartisan agreement in          
Congress, an Executive Branch eager for a war, the bloating of the defense budget and the                
overall militarization of US foreign policy—arguably combined most devastatingly in the Bush            
administration, following the attacks on 9/11, with the introduction of the broad War on Terror.               
The War on Terror came to be after bipartisan Congressional agreement to go to war; was                
initiated by a president who was advised by core members of Project for the New American                
Century (who had been pushing for the overthrowing of the Iraqi government since 1989 and               
who believed that American exceptionalism was powerful to the point that it could cause a               
domino effect of US ideology), and others who had previously worked for powerful defense              
contractors (notably Vice President Dick Cheney); and would lead to the United States into two               
wars that stretched the American military far beyond its capabilities and which have lasted              
almost two decades. 
The War on Terror, also led to the creation of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military                 
Force, which permitted the American president to use the military to combat the “nations,              
organizations, or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the            
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or             
persons,” a bill which has had a lasting and devastating impact. Each of the three presidents in                 16
the post-9/11 era have used the wide-ranging authorization of the AUMF as justification for              
military operations. A February 2018 report from the Congressional Research Service states that             
the AUMF “had been cited 37 times in connection with actions in 14 countries and on the high                  
16 ​U.S. Congress, Senate, ​Authorization for Use of Military Force​, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Introduced in Senate 
September 14, 2001, ​https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/23​.  
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seas:” 18 times by Bush, 21 by Obama, and, as of the date of publication, twice by Trump. The                   17
AUMF is only one of many examples of both parties finding common ground when it came to                 
determining American action on the world stage.  
III: The Washington Playbook: Bipartisanship in Foreign Policy Initiatives Since 1989 
In many major foreign policy initiatives of the past 30 years the bipartisan nature of the                
post-Cold War alliance is apparent both in Congress and within the administrations of the four               
post-Cold War presidents. At least in the initial stages of military operations, Congress has              
typically supported the president’s position, or at least deferred to the executive to make              
important decisions. However, in many of these cases the president launched operations without             
Congressional approval, only turning to the legislature for approval once the military campaigns             
had begun.  
The president’s position as the Commander-in-Chief, the fact that they can make crucial             
decisions more quickly than the legislature, the belief that “politics stops at the water's edge,”               
and Congress’ fear of contradicting the Executive in times of war have given the President               
outsized power in determining issues of foreign policy. As a result, much of the convergence of                
beliefs have been most easily observed through the various presidents, their cabinets and other              
advisors. While Congress has occasionally gone against the president’s wishes and voiced            
concerns over the office’s growing power, bipartisanship has nonetheless been apparent in the             
17  ​U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, ​Presidential References to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force in 
Publicly Available Executive Actions and Reports to Congress​, by Matthew Weed, CRS Report 7-4589, 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, February 16, 2018). 
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House and Senate. This can be true either by legislative support or by falling in line behind the                  
president and increasingly deferring to the executive’s desires.  
The convergence of views between the four presidents is noticeable in both actions and              
rhetoric. Despite occasionally emphasizing differences with the opposing party, the four           
post-Cold War Presidents often spoke in similar ways about the role of the country, and often                
staffed their administrations with the same people as their predecessors. Each of these politicians              
made sure to criticize their predecessor on the issues, but as Andrew Bacevich explains in               
American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy, ​written in 2002, both             
Bushes and Clinton had almost identical approaches to dealing with China, North Korea, Iraq,              
and Colombia. Bacevich elaborates that Clinton and George W. Bush “conceived of America’s             
proper role in a post-Cold War world in nearly identical terms. (...) They shared an identical                
belief in the importance of US military supremacy. (...) They voiced similar expectations for the               
future (...) To a remarkable extent, they agreed on the basic aims that should inform US policy                 
and the principles that should guide its conduct. (...) To be sure, not every adherent to that                 
consensus agreed on every detail; but on those things that mattered most, agreement was              
well-nigh unanimous.” George H.W. Bush, and, to a lesser extent, Obama, shared these same              18
beliefs. 
One of the ways that these agreements manifested themselves is in the propensity for              
intervention. According to the US Commission on National Security, between the Cold War and              
1999 the United States engaged in almost 50 military interventions, compared to 16 during the               
18 ​Andrew Bacevich, ​American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy​, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 214-215.  
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Cold War. To varying degrees, each of these presidents were responsible for engaging the              19
military in arenas around the world, including in Panama and Somalia (H.W. Bush), the Balkans               
and Haiti (Clinton), Iraq and Afghanistan (W. Bush), and Libya (Obama). A second             
manifestation of this consensus was the way in which these presidents and their administrations              
spoke about the importance of globalization and openness, America’s centrality in this open             
world, and the military’s role in maintaining this central position. George H.W. Bush would              
make openness—in his words “open borders, open trade and, most importantly, open            
minds”—the essence of American foreign policy during his term as president. As Bacevich             20
notes, however, “always, when it came to openness, expanding US access to markets abroad was               
the first order of business.” The President would consistently make the point that open markets               21
and free trade were central to “prosperity for every American job holder.” On issues of national                22
security, a Bush talking point during the 1988 campaign was that he would never “apologize for                
America,” regardless of what the facts were. In the foreign policy memoir written with              23
Scowcroft, Bush would acknowledge that while the first Gulf War was important because it              
demonstrated that the United States was willing to reach out to the rest of the world it was “even                   
more important to keep the strings of control tightly in our hands.”  24
19 ​U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, ​New World Coming: The United States Commission on 
National Security/21st Century​, Washington, DC, (1999), 128.  
20 ​George H.W. Bush, “Address before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Speech, New 
York City, October 1, 1990, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-45th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-n
ew-york-new-york​.  
21 ​Bacevich, ​American Empire​, 73. 
22 Quoted in Ibid., 74.  
23 ​George H.W. Bush, "Ethnic Coalition Speech.” Speech, August 2, 1988. 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4555921/user-clip-bush-ethnic-coalition-speech​.  
24 ​Scowcroft and Bush, ​A World Transformed​, 491.  
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Clinton, who defeated Bush in the 1992 election, and members of his administration             
echoed almost identical talking points. His first Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, noted             
“the driving force behind economic growth is openness—open markets, open investment, open            
communications, and open trade.” Again however, Clintonites emphasized that America’s          25
place in this open world was the most important. Albright declared “America’s place is at the                
center of this system”, while the President proclaimed that his country had to be “at the center of                  
every vital global network” in order to “dramatically increase our leverage to work with people               
for peace, for human rights and for stability.” On National Security, the Clinton administration,              26
like its predecessor, considered the United States to be the “indispensable nation.” At the start               27
of the 21st century, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger would pronounce that “today, just              
about everybody believes that we need a strong military to protect our interests in a world of                 
continuing if shifting dangers.”  28
George W. Bush’s rhetoric sounds notably similar to both his father’s and to Clinton’s.              
Bush, like Clinton, arrived in the Oval Office having defeated the closest thing to an incumbent,                
sitting Vice President Al Gore, in the 2000 election, by noting differences between himself and               
the prior administration. Yet, on the imperatives of freedom and openness, Bush offered only a               
slightly updated version of his predecessors’ talking points, stating that “the expectation of             
freedom is fed by free markets and expanded by free trade, and carried across borders by the                 
25 Quoted in Bacevich, ​American Empire, ​101.  
26 ​Quoted in Ibid., 113.  
27 ​Madeleine K. Albright, Interview on NBC-TV, ​"The Today Show" with Matt Lauer​, 
Columbus, Ohio, February 19, 1998, ​https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980219a.html​. 
28 ​Samuel Berger, “American Leadership in the 21st Century,” Speech, National Press Club, Washington D.C., 
January 6, 2000, ​https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/2000/000106_berger.html​.  
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Internet.” Talking about the importance and supremacy of the American military, Bush 43 and              29
his advisors were even more aggressive that Bush 41 and Clinton. Bush would say that the new                 
world that was “shaped by American courage, power and wisdom now echoes with American              
ideals;” his eventual Secretary of State Colin Powell would declare that the country “stands              30
ready to help any country wishing to join the democratic world; any country that puts the law in                  
place and begins to live by that rule, any country that seeks peace and prosperity and a place in                   
the sun.” Following 9/11 it was clear that to accomplish these goals, the United States would                31
use the full capacity of its military, whose capabilities remained, in the words of the president,                
“second to none.” In a divergence from both his father and his direct predecessor, the Bush                32
doctrine would embrace the concepts of unilateralism and preemptive strikes as crucial elements             
of his approach to foreign policy. 
After Bush left office with dwindling popularity—a decline partially attributable to the            
failing war in Iraq—Barack Obama ran his campaign more explicitly opposed to protracted wars              
and militarism than any of the three presidents before him. Yet his rhetoric on America’s               
relationship with the rest of the world remained largely the same. During his remarks after being                
awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, Obama would declare that the U.S. had “helped underwrite               
global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our                  
arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and                
29 ​Quoted in Bacevich, ​American Empire​, 217. 
30 ​George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” Speech, Charleston, S.C., September 23, 1999, 
http://www3.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html​. 
31 ​Colin Powell, “Remarks at Confirmation Hearing,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., 
January 17, 2001, ​https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/443.htm​.  
32 ​Quoted in Bacevich, ​American Empire​, 221. 
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prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the               
Balkans,” and in 2012 he would repeat Clinton and Albright’s formulation of the United States               33
as the “indispensable nation” in world affairs and maintain that as long as he was President, that                 
reality would not change. Obama did challenge some of the conventional wisdom on             34
intervention and militarism, but his Presidency did little to alter the central components of              
post-Cold American foreign policy: Liberal democratic ideals were ascendant, and American           
economic and military supremacy were central to this ascendancy.  
The other way in which these four Presidencies mirrored each other is in the ways in                
which they staffed their respective administrations. Colin Powell served as Chairman of the Joint              
Chiefs of Staff under George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and later became Secretary of State in                 
George W. Bush’s administration. Dick Cheney, the younger President Bush’s Vice President,            
had been the Secretary of Defense during his father’s Presidency. Brent Scowcroft, the elder              
Bush’s National Security Advisor, also served as Chairman of the President's Foreign            
Intelligence Advisory Board under George W. Bush. Robert Gates, the Director of Central             
Intelligence and Scowcroft’s Deputy, was named Secretary of Defense in 2006 and continued in              
this role through part of Obama’s first term. In short, many of the most important architects of                 
George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy vision reprised their roles, albeit in different positions, when              
his son took office eight years later. The same holds true on the Democratic side, as Barack                 
Obama was advised by many members of the Clinton administration, many of whom have              
33 ​Barack H. Obama, “Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace,” Speech, Oslo City Hall, Oslo, Norway, December 
10, 2009, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/nobel-peace-prize-oslo-2009-speech.html​.  
34 Barack H. Obama, “State of the Union Address,” Speech,  Washington, DC, January 25, 2011, 
https://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133224933/transcript-obamas-state-of-union-address​.  
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reprised their roles for more recent nominees Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden, who served as               
Secretary of State and Vice President under Obama, respectively. The power of established             
leaders in each of the two major parties ensures the perpetuation of the same ways of thinking on                  
many important issues, including statesmanship and foreign policy.  
The creation of this foreign policy elite—which controls much of the decision-making in             
the country—is apparent not only within and between presidential administrations, but also in             
think tanks, which often housed important officials when the opposing party took office, and              
served as “policy shops” for administrations when they same party controlled the presidency. As              
Walt lays out in great detail in ​The Hell of Good Intentions​, the foreign policy community,                
consisting of government officials, think tank employees, academics, and members of the media,             
occupy a commanding presence in foreign policy making, and can plausibly fulfill a career by               
bouncing between these fields. This elite, derisively termed “The Blob” by Obama advisor Ben              35
Rhodes, like the presidents outlined above, often engage in groupthink when it comes to the               
understanding of America’s role in the world and tend to promote an activist American foreign               
policy. Although such think tanks exist both on the left (Center for American Progress, Center               
for a New American Security) and right (American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation,            
and the now-defunct PNAC), they often converge on ideas of American action and intervention,              
and were mostly supporters of the Iraq War in 2003, and the phenomenon of the cycle between                 
these think tanks and various governmental positions existed on both sides of the aisle.  36
35 ​As an example, Richard Haas worked in the NSC, DOD, and the State Department during H.W. Bush’s 
administration, worked at Hamilton College at Brookings during the Clinton years, returned to State under Powell 
from 2001 from 2003, and has led the Council on Foreign Relations ever since.  
36 ​For more on this dynamic, see Walt, ​The Hell of Good Intentions​, Chapter 3, “Defining the ‘Blob’: What is the 
‘Foreign Policy Community’?” 
22 
 
Malley 
 
  
While the center of American foreign policy has remained the Presidency and the             
Executive Branch, influenced by outside groups, Congress’ role is also important. Although            
presidents have launched military operations without consulting Congress, many of these           
decisions are often eventually brought to the legislature for approval. While this dynamic leaves              
Congress in a difficult situation, many of the votes on these post-Cold War interventions show a                
Congress either willing to support the president’s decision—at least initially and often in a              
bipartisan manner—or at a minimum neglecting to oppose the choices made by the executive.              
These trends, somewhat blunted in the years directly following the Cold War, have become              
exacerbated after 9/11 and perhaps even more so during the Obama Presidency. The following              
paragraphs will explore Congress’ role in a series of important foreign policy decisions since              
1989.  
House Joint Resolution 658 in 1990 declared that Congress “supports the deployment of             
U.S. armed forces to the Persian Gulf region and expresses appreciation to such forces,” and               
passed the House by a 380-29 vote. A similar resolution was passed in the Senate by a vote of                   37
96-3. Although initial attempts to authorize force in the following Congress failed, both the              38
House and Senate of the 102nd Congress eventually agreed to allow the president to continue to                
deploy armed forces in Iraq. 
The intervention in the Somali Civil War presented a slightly more complicated situation.             
The original Senate Joint Resolution “authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces in              
37 U.S. Congress, House, ​United States Policy on Iraqi Aggression Resolution​, H.J. Res 658, 101st Cong., 
Introduced in House September 27, 1990, ​https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-joint-resolution/658​.  
38 ​U.S. Congress, Senate, ​A concurrent resolution supporting the actions taken by the President with respect to Iraqi 
aggression against Kuwait.​ S. Con. Res. 147, 101st Cong., Introduced in Senate September 28, 1990, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-concurrent-resolution/147​.  
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Somalia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution” passed the Senate and the             
House, the former by voice vote and the latter with a large majority of Democratic support and                 
only three Republicans voting in favor. However, a Republican amendment that sought to limit              39
the timeframe of the operation was voted down, with 48 Republicans siding with a large majority                
of Democrats. Following the Battle of Mogadishu, in October 1993, during which an American              40
Black Hawk Helicopter was shot down, resulting in 19 Americans dead and 73 wounded,              
Congress passed, by voice vote, a bill demanding that troops be withdrawn by the end of the                 
following March. This series of events demonstrated that, at the very least, Congress was              41
willing to use its war powers when American lives were lost during an operation in which                
American security was not at stake and humanitarian aid seemed to be the only reason for                
intervention.  
After approving of the first Gulf War and demanding Clinton withdraw from Somalia,             
“Congress started backsliding in the early 1990s,” in terms of their oversight role, according to               
Stephen Weismann “when the Clinton administration sent forces to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo             
without congressional authorization.” In the early stages of the NATO-led interventions in the             42
former Yugoslavia, the House and Senate voted to express support for the US taking part in these                 
missions, doing so through Senate Resolution 330 (Bosnia) and House Concurrent Resolution 42             
39 ​U.S. Congress, Senate, ​Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia​, S.J. Res. 45, 
103rd Cong., Introduced in Senate February 4, 1993, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/senate-joint-resolution/45​.  
40 ​H.Amdt.67 to Ibid. ​http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll180.xml​.  
41 ​U.S. Congress, House, ​Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove 
United States Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.​, H. Con. Res. 170, 103rd Cong., Introduced in 
House October 22, 1993, ​https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/170​.  
42 Stephen Weissman, “Congress and War: How the House and the Senate Can Reclaim Their Role,” ​Foreign 
Affairs​, January/February 2017, ​https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-12-12/congress-and-war​.  
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(Kosovo). Despite these votes of support, the Congressional Research Services states that “The             43
United States participated in both United Nations and NATO actions without explicit            
congressional authorization.” In 1994, the Senate voted on bill 2042, which stated “that no              44
ground combat troops should be deployed to Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress;”             
this was largely ignored by the President as NATO took over ground operations in Bosnia in                
December 1995. Following this development, according to political scientist Ryan C.           45
Hendrickson “the House voted to show support for the U.S. troops, but also expressed its               
opposition to Clinton's policy. In effect, the House admitted defeat and demonstrated that it was               
unwilling to test Clinton on constitutional war powers issues.” In voting for Resolution 99, by               46
a vote of 69-30, the Senate eventually reached the same conclusion. This series of votes               47
demonstrates that even when wars may be unpopular in Congress, and even when that Congress’               
majority desires to obstruct the president’s agenda and curb his power, as was the case in the                 
1994 GOP-led House, it has shied away from using its most potent tool—the power of the                
purse—to effectively stand in the way. 
The Iraq War, launched by Republican Bush 43 in 2003, passed the Senate by an               
overwhelming margin of 77-23, with majorities of both parties voting in support. The support in               
the House was weaker, but nearly 40% of Democrats still voted to authorize a president of the                 
opposing party to launch a war. Notably, three of the four most powerful members of               
43 ​U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Armed Forces Abroad: Selected 
Congressional Votes Since 1982, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Carla Y. Davis-Castro, RL31693, (2020), 11.  
44 ​Ibid. 
45 ​Ibid.  
46 Ryan C. Hendrickson, “War Powers, Bosnia, and the 104th Congress,” ​Political Science Quarterly, ​Vol. 113, No. 
2, (1998), 253, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2657855.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A851e5575514f07814c102cbf454cd050​.  
47 ​Ibid. 
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Democratic leadership (with the exception of House Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi) voted in favor              
of the resolution. The aforementioned AUMF of 2001 passed even more decisively, with no              48
Senators and only one member of the House voting nay. These decisions were heavily              49
influenced by the Bush administration’s presentation of misleading information about the           
situation in Iraq, as the White House assured Congress that Hussein had weapons of mass               
destruction, as well as the administration’s promises to get US troops out of the country within a                 
matter of months. Still, Congress voted in favor of these proposals within a week of President                
Bush announcing the decision to go to war.   50
During the Obama years, Congress seemed even less eager to use their powers when it               
came to foreign affairs. Congress did not vote on Obama’s military surge in Afghanistan. In               
Libya, the Senate refused to hold votes on authorization (which would have been held after the                
UN-led coalition had already began its mission), and the GOP-led House “arranged votes on              
three very different resolutions: one that would authorize the use of force in Libya, one that                
would defund U.S. drones’ participation in the operation (...) and one that would mandate an               
immediate U.S. withdrawal. None passed.” In Syria, as well, Congress held very few public              51
hearings or votes about American action, or lack thereof. One bill that did pass, which offered                
military support to a group of Syrian rebels, gave, according to one of its supporters, Senator                
Barbara Boxer “the administration the wind at their back if they want to move forward,”               
48 ​U.S. Congress, House, ​Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002​, H.J. Res. 114, 
107th Cong., Introduced in House October 2, 2002, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/114​.  
49 ​U.S. Congress, Senate, ​Authorization for Use of Military Force​, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Introduced in Senate 
September 14, 2001, ​https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/23​.  
50 ​Weissman, Congress and War. 
51 ​Ibid. 
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acknowledging that the executive would make the final decision. The Senate also did not vote               52
when the President sought their support to take retaliatory strikes against the Assad government              
for using chemical weapons against his citizens, when a Russian-led diplomatic effort halted the              
need for a Congressional vote. Through these examples, it appears as if Congress has typically               
either supported the president’s decision for internvention or offered passive resistance, which            
has almost never resulted in concrete changes.  
The broader neoliberal consensus on foreign policy was evident not only in votes on              
military intervention, but on other issues as well, notably those of free trade and strengthening               
NATO. When Democratic President Clinton signed NAFTA into law in 1993, he did so with               
75% of support from Republicans in the House, and 40% from his own party. The numbers in                 
the Senate were almost identical, with half of Democrats and three-quarters of Republicans             
voting in favor. In terms of building their European alliance, George H.W Bush ushered a               53
re-unified Germany into NATO, while Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama each extended NATO             
further East, with the additions of, among other nations, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia,             
Estonia, Croatia, and Montenegro. Each of these nations had previously been a part of Eastern               
powers Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.  
To be sure, Democratic and Republican administrations diverged in some less noticeable,            
albeit meaningful, ways. This dynamic is most clearly seen in the debate of unilateralism against               
multilateralism and the desire for diplomatic solutions as opposed to military ones. In 2007              
52 ​Quoted in Ibid.  
53 ​U.S. Congress, House, ​North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act​, H.R 3450, 103rd Cong., 
Introduced in House November 4, 1993, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/3450/actions?KWICView=false​.  
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Strobe Talbott, then the President of the Brookings Institution wrote about George W. Bush,              
“Profoundly skeptical about the utility of international treaties, international institutions and           
international law, the current president annulled, un-signed or otherwise withdrew from a range             
of international agreements and mechanisms—the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the           
International Criminal Court, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.” Likewise, his invasion of Iraq            54
was led by the United States alone, not by an international organization, and was joined by the                 
so-called “coalition of the willing,” one in which Great Britain was the only other major country                
involved.  
On the flipside, Republicans in Congress have often been critical of Democratic            
presidents who pursue multilateralism. The Republican’s ten-point Contract with America,          
which partially led to an overwhelming victory in the 1994 midterms read “No U.S. troops under                
UN command and restoration of the essential parts of our national security funding to strengthen               
our own national defense and maintain credibility around the world.” The next Democratic             55
President, Obama, whose major foreign policy initiatives were typically pursued in a bipartisan             
fashion, was mercilessly attacked by Republicans who blasted his foreign policy as “leading             
from behind” (a quote often attributed by opponents to the President himself but which was               
actually uttered by an anonymous White House official).  56
In their relationships with the so-called “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran,              
especially in the aftermath of Iraq, Democrats often accused Republicans of being too bellicose              
54 ​Strobe Talbott, “Unilateralism: Anatomy of a Foreign Policy Disaster,” ​The Brookings Institution​, February 21, 
2007, ​https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/unilateralism-anatomy-of-a-foreign-policy-disaster/​.  
55 “​Contract with America,” 1994, ​https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/contract-with-america/​. 
56 ​Josh Rogin, “Who really said Obama was ‘leading from behind’?,” ​Foreign Policy, ​October 27, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/27/who-really-said-obama-was-leading-from-behind/​.  
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and therefore risking getting entangled into another war. Republicans, for their part, were nearly              
universally opposed to President Obama’s pursuit of diplomatic agreements with Iran and Cuba,             
an approach that went against the Bush-era credo: “We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”                57
Despite these frequent characterizations of the “reckless right” and the “feckless left”, they were              
often used as a way to give the illusion of partisan discord, while the two sides primarily                 
remained in lockstep on the big issues of openness, militarism, and intervention. Even as data               
shows that since the 1990s American politics has grown increasingly partisan and polarized,             
agreement on these core questions has remained intact. 
However, a number of recent global trends have poked holes in this consensus.             
Concurrently, the factors that permitted for the agreement between the center-right and            
center-left, have begun to deteriorate. As a result, both parties have a growing anti-war              
movement, and these elements are no longer limited to the fringes of each party. Further, the                
seemingly unending presence of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and America’s large             
military footprint elsewhere in the world, even nearly three decades after the end of the Cold                
War and two decades after 9/11, with little progress to show for it has led to a growing                  
proportion of Americans being wary of the potential benefits of entering conflicts abroad. A              
2019 poll from Pew Research Center indicates that “59 percent of Americans said the war in                
Afghanistan was ‘not worth fighting,’ while “only 27 percent of Americans ‘say that military              
interventions in other countries [to solve conflicts] make the United States safer.’” Despite at              58
57 ​Leslie H. Gelb, "In the End, Every President Talks to the Bad Guys," ​The Washington Post​, April 27, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/24/AR2008042401459.html​.  
58 ​Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. veterans, public say the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not 
worth fighting,” ​Pew Research Center, ​July 10, 2019, 
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times governing to the contrary, each of the last two presidents, from opposing parties and               
almost diametrically opposed in all other ways, have made an aversion to getting embroiled in               
unwinnable wars one of the central themes of their campaigns. The following sections will              
examine the growing possibility and reality of a progressive/populist coalition centered on a             
non-interventionist foreign policy. 
  
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afgha
nistan-were-not-worth-fighting/​.  
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Section C: Analysis 
IV: Populists and Progressives: The Growing Possibility of a New Bipartisan 
Coalition 
Anti-war voices, on both sides of the political spectrum, are not a new phenomenon.              
Following the Vietnam War, politicians on both sides of the political aisle became wary of               
getting embroiled in foreign conflicts, and the progressive left tried (and failed) to nominate the               
explicitly anti-war Eugene McCarthy in 1968. However, as the neoconservative/liberal          
internationalist consensus described in the first section crystalized, the acceptance of liberal            
democratic hegemony and militarism also solidified. As Bacevich explains, by the 1990s “In the              
political mainstream, the vision of a world allowing capitalism free reign with the US military               
functioning as a sort of global hall monitor found favor with Democrats and Republicans alike.               
Disagreement meant marginalization. Ambitious youngsters keen to make their mark in           
Washington knew better than to suggest that the time might be ripe for curbing the nation’s                
appetite for remaking the world in its own image.” The opposition to this new globalized,               59
militarized foreign policy was relegated to, “a crabbed minority on the far right and left.”   60
Among this crabbed minority was the nativist Republican Patrick Buchanan, who           
unsuccessfully ran for president in three successive elections between 1992 and 2000. Buchanan             
was adamantly opposed to globalism, did not believe that the end of the Cold War had “brought                 
with it an end to history” and argued that the United States needed to question “all the                 
institutions of the Cold War, from vast permanent U.S. armies on foreign soil, to old alliances                
59 ​Bacevich, ​Age of Illusions​, 76. 
60 ​Bacevich, ​American Empire, ​1.  
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against Communist enemies that no longer exist.” Another candidate in the 1992 Presidential             61
campaign, businessman Ross Perot, would argue that globalism was costing American jobs and             
that militarism was costly to American workers, too. According to Perot it was unjust “to take                
the sons and daughters of working people” in order to combat “a problem somewhere around the                
world.” These nationalist, “America first” foreign policy instincts have become even more            62
powerful in the aftermath of long-term military activity around the world, and now have a               
nominal champion residing in the White House. This trend has not been limited to the United                
States. In the past few years, there has been a rising movement around the world on both the                  
right, represented by, among others Trump, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Brazilian            
President Jair Bolsonaro, and the left, as embodied by Senator Sanders and former British Labor               
leader Jeremy Corbyn, that has questioned the success of globalism over the past 30 years.  
The left has, historically, had a larger and more influential anti-war wing. The             
aforementioned McCarthy in 1968 (in the aftermath of Vietnam), and subsequently Howard            
Dean in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008 (during the war in Iraq) centered non-intervention as                
part of their respective campaign platforms. However, the most stringent anti-interventionists           
typically failed to make inroads on the national stage. Obama’s Presidency, despite providing             
some meaningful challenges, proved that the neoconservative/liberal internationalist consensus         
was still powerful in Washington, DC. While Obama managed to not send many additional              
American troops into battle, avoided military catastrophes on the level of Vietnam and Iraq, and               
accomplished historical diplomatic feats with Iran and Cuba, he also didn’t end the wars in Iraq                
61 ​Patrick Buchanan, “A Crossroads in Our Country’s History,” Speech, Concord, New Hampshire, December 10, 
2001, ​http://www.4president.org/speeches/1992/patbuchanan1992announcement.htm​.  
62 ​Quoted in Bacevich, ​Age of Illusions, ​55.  
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and Afghanistan, increased the levels of drone warfare, entered an ill-advised coalition to             
overthrow Muammar Gaddafhi in Libya, administered a troop surge in Afghanistan, and            
generally failed to redefine the parameters of American leadership or curb the militarism of              
American foreign policy.   63
As evidenced in the above section, while Congress could play a role in constraining any               
future president’s actions abroad, the Executive Branch will likely continue to be the hub of               
American foreign policy decision-making. The 2016 and 2020 presidential elections suggested           
that an executive branch transformation away from a militarized foreign policy may be possible.              
In the first, Bernie Sanders ran on an anti-trade, anti-war message and surprisingly challenged              
Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary. Then, Donald Trump, promising to put “America             
first” in his foreign policy defeated her in the general election. Prior to the election, both Sanders                 
and Trump were considered outsiders within their own parties, but partly due to their              
anti-globalization rhetoric, both overperformed relative to expectations for their success. While           
Sanders ultimately came up short in both 2016 and 2020, he ran two fairly strong campaigns,                
indisputably moving the conversation in the Democratic Party to the left. While much of              
Sanders’ platform was centered on his social democratic domestic vision, he often drew points of               
contrast with his more centrist opponents over their support for the Iraq War and NAFTA. In                
2020, some commentators contended that, as much of the party moved towards Sanders on              
domestic policy, his progressive outlook on foreign affairs would distinguish him more clearly             
from the rest of the field.   64
63 Bacevich, ​The Age of Illusions​, 130.  
64 ​Peter Beinart, “It’s Foreign Policy that Distinguishes Bernie This Time,” ​The Atlantic​, February 21, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/foreign-policy-distinguishes-bernie-sanders-2020/583279/​.  
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The left’s evaluation of the issues plaguing American foreign policy touches on many of              
the elements of the liberal internationalist/neoconservative consensus—ranging from the costs of           
intervention, to trade deals, to the theory of globalization to the militarism of the foreign policy                
apparatus. Matt Duss, Sanders’ foreign policy advisor, stated on February 19 that, while an              
America under his boss would reverse the interventionist nature of American foreign policy,             
such a progressive administration would also “be clear about the values and the outcomes the US                
favors — self-determination and human rights, respect for people's dignity and their security.”             65
This progressive foreign policy understands America’s failures partly because of the harm they             
caused in countries that the United States was purportedly helping. Many of the critiques from               
the left on America’s longest-lasting wars—whether Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan—have been           
framed in terms of the civilian lives lost and the impact on the invaded countries.  
Sanders was not the only candidate in the huge Democratic primary field to voice              
concerns over the current status of American foreign policy. Elizabeth Warren—whose           
anti-corruption crusade was central to her Presidential campaign—spoke often in debates about            
the “revolving door” and the military industrial complex. Her lead foreign policy advisor, Sasha              
Baker, told ​The Nation “today we have a Pentagon that is so large and so overdeveloped, relative                 
to our other instruments of foreign policy, that the way we engage with the world is through the                  
military, and that’s completely backwards.” Pete Buttigieg, a military veteran, not considered to             66
65 ​John Haltiwanger, “Bernie Sanders' foreign policy adviser breaks down the senator's progressive global agenda 
for 2020,” ​Business Insider​, February 25, 2019, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/matt-duss-bernie-sanders-foreign-policy-adviser-2019-2​.   
66 ​David Klion, “The Woman Behind Elizabeth Warren’s Foreign Policy," ​The Nation​, February 18, 2020, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/sasha-baker-elizabeth-warren-foreign-policy/​.  
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be as progressive as Sanders or Warren, called for the repeal of the 2001 AUMF. Interestingly,                67
a vote of an amendment to S. 1 in 2019, which resolved, in part, that “the precipitous withdrawal                  
of United States forces from [Iraq or Syria] country could put at risk hard-won gains and United                 
States national security,” counted among its 20 Democratic (or independent, in the case of              
Sanders) dissenters six of the seven Senators running for the party’s nomination.  68
On the Republican side, Donald Trump was the first nominee in the post-World War II               
era to harken back to the past isolationist instincts of conservatism. While Trump’s approach to               69
foreign policy (and to the presidency more generally) since taking office is an outlier, his               
ascension to that position is a reflection and a catalyst of the potential end of the post-Cold War                  
foreign policy era. As a candidate, Trump was adamant about his “America First” policy—which              
often translated to isolationism and especially an aversion to international organizations and            
established foreign policy norms. On trade, Trump constantly railed against past deals, namely             
NAFTA, and the cost they incurred for American workers, promising that he would tear up the                
deal on the first chance he got.  
Trump also repudiated the concept of American global leadership—a hallmark of           
American foreign policy for decades—telling the ​New York Times ​in a 2016 interview “I don’t               
know that we have a right to lecture. Just look about what’s happening with our country. How                 
67 ​Josh Lederman, “Buttigieg vows to seek repeal of post-9/11 war powers resolution,” ​NBC News​, June 11, 2019, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/buttigieg-vows-seek-repeal-post-9-11-war-powers-resolution-n101
6331​.  
68 ​These six “Nay” voters were Senators Booker (NJ), Gillibrand (NY), Harris (CA), Klobuchar (MN), Sanders 
(VT), and Warren (MA). The only presidential candidate to vote in support of this amendment was Bennet (CO). 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=1&vote=000
13#position 
69  William Hitchcock “How the GOP Embraced the World—And Then Turned Away”, ​Politico​, July 13, 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/13/gop-isolationism-trump-eisenhower-219003​.  
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are we going to lecture when people are shooting our policemen in cold blood. How are we                 
going to lecture when you see the riots and the horror going on in our own country. (...) We’re                   
not in a position to be more aggressive. We have to fix our own mess.” Furthermore, the                 70
President has repeatedly bemoaned the existence of NATO, and complained that other countries             
have not paid their fair share, going as far as telling the ​Times ​that he would be prepared to tell a                     
country not paying up that they would have to defend themselves without the help of the United                 
States. Trump also lamented the fact that the United States would be forced into defending               71
countries that he deemed inconsequential, like Montenegro, if they were ever to be attacked.              72
This aversion towards global leadership and an interconnected world stands in stark contrast to              
the talking points of his recent predecessors.  
The legislature has, in certain instances, stood up for the status quo of American foreign               
policy in the face of pressure from the Trump administration, notably in its opposition to               
withdrawing troops from Syria and its decision to uphold sanctions on Russia. However, at other               
times, Congress has decided to push back against American intervention. The Sanders/Lee bill             
addressing the War in Yemen is arguably the most important example: It was a demonstration of                
a tangible, legislative accomplishment between representatives of America’s progressive left and           
70  “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO. Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World,” ​The New York Times ​July 21, 
2016,  ​https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html​.  
71 Ibid. 
72 John Wagner, “Trump says defending tiny NATO ally Montenegro could lead to World War II,” ​The Washington 
Post​, July 18, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-defending-tiny-nato-ally-montenegro-could-lead-to-world-war
-iii/2018/07/18/f7a09276-8a80-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html​.  
 
 
36 
 
Malley 
 
  
its libertarian right, and it concurrently challenged the growing power of the Executive in foreign               
affairs. 
The lens through which American foreign policy is viewed is also shifting. In the past,               
debate over American foreign policy was limited by the shared belief in American             
exceptionalism and leadership being central to foreign policy decision making. While Zack            
Beauchamp of ​Vox contends that “Washington’s foreign policy debate tends to be mostly             
conducted between the center and the right. The issue is typically how much force America               
should use rather than whether it should use it at all, or how to tweak a free-trade agreement                  
rather than whether it should be accepted at all,” the reality is that the discussion is constricted to                  
an area on the political axis between the center-left and center-right, leaving little space for               
dissenting voices on either side.   73
Recent debates in Washington demonstrate how, even in the absence of tangible change,             
these parameters are not as impermeable as they once were. As Nikolas Gvosdev explains in the                
National Interest​, in the aftermath of the vote condemning Trump’s withdrawal from Syria “The              
dominant narrative—of a surrender of U.S. leadership—prevailed, but the counter-narrative          
expressed by the President—why are we there—showed that it could gain traction.” Trump’s             74
approach to foreign policy, along with the increasing skepticism toward the post-Cold War             
73 ​Zack Beauchamp, “Why Democrats have no foreign policy ideas,” ​Vox​, September 5, 2017, 
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/5/16220054/democrats-foreign-policy-think-tanks​.  
74 ​Nikolas Gvosdev, “Can a 'Trumpian' Foreign Policy Stick?”, ​The National Interest, ​November 9, 2019, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-trumpian-foreign-policy-stick-95196​.  
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consensus articulated on the left, have at least ensured that we can begin redefining our approach                
to foreign policy and asking the right questions before entering into another armed conflict. 
There have also been other instances that have given credence to the idea that these two                
otherwise ideologically divergent factions have found a small window of overlap on this             
particular issue. In the run-up to the 2016 election, a number of left-wing journalists and               
intellectuals suggested that Trump, who appeared untethered to the American foreign policy            
establishment, represented a better chance at ending America’s endless wars than did Hillary             
Clinton, who had been aligned with the past two Democratic presidential administrations, who             
had voted for the Iraq War in 2003, and who has been cited as one of the primary architects of                    
the intervention in Libya.  
Even since Trump has assumed office, some in favor of a more restrained foreign policy               
have voiced their support for his foreign policy impulses, though not always his policies. “Here’s               
an uncomfortable truth,” said Jeremy Scahill, the co-founder of the leftist publication ​The             
Intercept​, in January 2019, “Donald Trump probably represents the best hope that we’ve had              
since 9/11 to actually end some of these forever wars.” Scahill admits that he doesn’t “trust                
anything that Trump says unless it’s backed up by indisputable facts, but the mere reality that                
he’s saying that he wants to get the US out of these wars requires those of us who oppose US                    
militarism and hegemony to analyze this moment for the opportunity that it possibly presents.”              75
75 Jeremy Scahill, “Donald Trump is a Liar but he May Represent our Best Hope to End the US ‘Forever Wars,’” 
The Intercept​, January 22, 2019, 
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/22/donald-trump-is-a-liar-but-he-may-represent-our-best-hope-to-end-the-u-s-forev
er-wars/​. 
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This sentiment has been reflected by other progressives who were among the most ardent critics               
of President Bush’s foreign policy approach. 
On the other side of the aisle, a number of pro-Trump conservatives, who have partially               
supported him due to his ostensible aversion to military conflict, have criticized the President              
when his actions do not match his campaign rhetoric. Tucker Carlson, one of the most popular                
hosts on Fox News, has debated guests on the validity of sending the US military to various                 
Middle Eastern countries, namely Syria, Iran, and Iraq. With Trump seemingly on the verge of               
going to war with Iran in January 2020, Carlson told one interviewee “[w]e actually don’t face                
any domestic threat from Iran,” and asked another, “tell me how many Americans in the United                
States have been murdered by terrorists backed by Iran since 9/11?” According to the liberal               76
journalist Peter Beinart in The Atlantic, Carlson was “moderating a debate between the two              
strands of thinking that have dominated conservative foreign policy for roughly a century (...)              
Some conservatives oppose restraints on American sovereignty primarily because they want the            
U.S. to impose its will on other countries. (Think Dick Cheney.) Other conservatives oppose              
those restraints primarily because they want to prevent other countries from imposing their will              
on the United States. (Think Ron Paul.)” Carlson’s way of thinking has also found a home with                 77
other conservatives, mostly those who would fall further to the right on the typical political               
spectrum.  
76 Quoted in Peter Beinart, “Tucker Carlson is Doing Something Extraordinary,” ​The Atlantic, ​July 13, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/tucker-carlson-is-doing-something-extraordinary/533586
/​.  
77 Ibid. 
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The 2020 campaign has offered another opening for this agreement between right and             
left. Tulsi Gabbard, a representative from Hawai’i who failed to make inroads in the Democratic               
Primary for a number of reasons, made an avowed opposition to regime change wars the center                
of her presidential campaign. She formed a small yet interesting coalition of anti-imperialist             
leftists and isolationist or pro-Russia voters who might otherwise have supported Trump. In fact,              
a University of New Hampshire poll of the state’s primary in early 2002 showed that Gabbard                
had the support of 28% of respondents who identified as Republican, 7% of independents and               
only 2% of Democrats. These kinds of polls demonstrate how Gabbard’s campaign            78
simultaneously deterred voters from her own party while also bringing in others who would not               
typically support a Democratic candidate, perhaps disillusioned Trump supporters who were           
primarily drawn in by his “America First” foreign policy. 
The final notable example of this growing counter-coalition is the 2020 foundation of the              
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a think tank funded by mega donors on the left               
(George Soros) and the right (Charles Koch). As described in the second chapter, think tanks               
have typically served the interests of the neoconservative/liberal internationalists foreign policy           
consensus. Yet, the Quincy Institute, named after former President John Quincy Adams, who             
said in 1821 that America “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” states that it                 
“promotes ideas that move U.S. foreign policy away from endless war and toward vigorous              
diplomacy in the pursuit of international peace,” and it is led by Andrew Bacevich, a               
self-described conservative who has been among the most poignant critics of establishment            
78  Sean P. McKinley, Zachary S. Azem and Andrew E. Smith, “Sanders, Warren & Biden Remain Top Among NH 
Dem Voters; Trump Holds Massive Lead Over GOP Rivals,” University of New Hampshire Survey Center, October 
29, 2019, ​https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1567&context=survey_center_polls​.  
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foreign policy for more than two decades. The Quincy Institute brands itself as explicitly              79
“transpartisan” and employs experts from across the political spectrum. David Klion, a            
progressive journalist for The Nation writes that the Quincy Institute represents a “critique not              
only of neoconservatives like [co-founder of PNAC Bill] Kristol but also of liberal             
interventionists like Samantha Power, Barack Obama’s UN ambassador, who see a responsibility            
to protect vulnerable communities by the use of military force as a core principle of US foreign                 
policy.” Each of these situations have offered glimpses into a future in which military              80
intervention is seen as a last resort, and not the first step towards solving any crisis.  
To be sure, there are notable, meaningful differences between the left-wing vision for a              
non-interventionist foreign policy and its right-wing alternative. As the sentiments put forth by             
people like Duss and Baker express, the broad vision for a progressive foreign policy include a                
reorientation towards diplomacy, an admission that the United States has not historically been             
only a force for good, and consistent concern for human rights abuses. As it stands, according to                 
these progressives, the United States has been very selective in its opposition to human rights               
abuses; feigning outrage when they emerge from historic adversaries like Iran and Cuba, but              
turning a blind eye when the perpetrators are allies like Saudi Arabia or Israel. 
The right-wing opposition to intervention appears to stem from the libertarian belief that             
money spent on other countries is fiscally irresponsible, and the populist wing’s sentiment that              
the turn towards globalism has been a failure that has unfairly burdened the American taxpayer               
and the American soldier. These feelings have typically been manifested in aversion towards             
79 “Mission Statement,” ​Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft​, ​https://quincyinst.org/about/​.  
80 David Klion, “Can a New Think Tank Put a Stop to Endless War?,” ​The Nation​, July 29, 2019, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/quincy-institute-responsible-statecraft-think-tank/​.  
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military over-extension and opposition to trade deals. Otherwise, many of the ideals originate             
from some of the same racist feelings that have been a driver of Republican domestic policy                
under Trump. Leaked recordings from 2006 and 2008 show Fox News host Carlson, who in               
many ways has become the symbolic representation of the anti-war right, saying ““I hate the war                
… I just have zero sympathy for them [Iraqis] or their culture. A culture where people just don’t                  
use toilet paper or forks.” and “Iraq is a crappy place filled with a bunch of, you know,                  
semiliterate primitive monkeys. That’s why it wasn’t worth invading.” These quotes hardly            81
seem consistent with Duss’ assertion that dignity and human rights be central to American              
foreign policy. 
Beyond the different sources for their discomfort with the foreign policy consensus, the             
left and the right also seem to disagree over the role of international organizations and the role of                  
the military within the larger scope of American foreign policy. The left generally speaks about               
the United States remaining engaged with the world, but doing more diplomatically and by using               
alliances with other countries. The right tends to favor a more isolationist approach, but a               
tendency towards the military when engagement is required.  
This tendency is perhaps best represented by Trump, who, despite shunning the need for              
alliances and international organizations, has praised American military strength, and has had no             
problem threatening to use this strength, even in unconventional and at times illegal ways. But               
his willingness to exert this power is not rooted in a desire to spread any values or beliefs, but                   
81 Madeline Peltz, “Tucker Carlson's anti-war posture has been racist since the Bush era,” ​Media Matters for 
America​, January 9, 2020, 
https://www.mediamatters.org/tucker-carlson/tucker-carlsons-anti-war-posture-has-been-racist-bush-era​.  
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rather simply to demonstrate that the United States is stronger than all other countries. Even if it                 
can be argued that most American Presidents have acted primarily in their own self-interest on               
the global stage, Trump is a rare leader who has not even rhetorically emphasized the United                
States’ role as a champion for democracy. While Trump has not brought in many of the voices                 
who played a role in foreign affairs for his Republican predecessors, one of the few former                
government officials was one of the most hawkish members of the second Bush administration,              
Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, who served as Trump’s third National Security              
Advisor. The appointment of Bolton, who has openly advocated for wars in North Korea and               
Iran, along with many of Trump’s own statements, indicate that he has been itching for a war for                  
much of his first term in office.  
Trump’s support for militarism, if not military intervention, is also evidenced by his             
relaxing of the regulations limiting drone warfare under Obama. Though drone warfare’s covert             
nature means that finding entirely accurate data is difficult, a report published in ​The Daily Beast                
states that “Obama launched 186 drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan during his first               
two years in office. In Trump’s first two years, he launched 238.” Moreover, “the Trump               
administration has carried out 176 strikes in Yemen in just two years, compared with 154 there                
during all eight years of Obama’s tenure, according to a count by The Associated Press and the                 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism.”  82
Given the differences in approach from the two sides of this proposed coalition, the              
concept of “transpartisanship” echoed throughout the Quincy Institute’s website, is paramount to            
82 S.E. Cupp, “Under Donald Trump, drone strikes far exceed Obama’s numbers,” ​Chicago Sun-Times,​ May 8, 2019, 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2019/5/8/18619206/under-donald-trump-drone-strikes-far-exceed-obama-s-num
bers​.  
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any potential future success in this endeavour. Trita Parsi, the Institute’s executive Vice             
President explains: “Bipartisanship is when you have two sides, they disagree, and then they              
come to an agreement with some sort of compromise that neither side is really happy with.”                
Transpartisanship, contrarily is when “you have two sides, they disagree on a whole bunch of               
issues, but they have overlapping views. Neither side compromises. They’re just collaborating on             
issues they already are in agreement over.” Some previous literature on the topic of cross-party               83
coalition building has suggested that more moderate and longer-tenured members of the            
legislature are more likely to engage with members of the other party than more ideologically               
extreme and newer members. This would theoretically be problematic for this particular            84
coalition, as many of the anti-war voices on either side tend to be in the minority for their party                   
and tend to have assumed office more recently.  
For example, nine of the 11 Republican Congressmen who voted both to withdraw troops              
from Yemen and against House Joint Resolution 77, a resolution condemning the decision to end               
United States efforts to prevent Turkish military operations against Syrian Kurdish forces in             
Northeast Syria were elected to the House since 2011, and seven of them are members of the                 
far-right Freedom Caucus. On the Democratic side, the movement is a combination of             85
old-school anti-war figures such as Sanders and Senator Jeff Merkley, and a younger generation              
83 Klion, “Can a New Think Tank Put a Stop to Endless War?”. 
84 Lynda W. Powell, Constructing Bipartisan Coalitions to Pass Legislation, ​Social Science Research​ ​Council, 
(2020), ​ ​https://items.ssrc.org/democracy-papers/constructing-bipartisan-coalitions-to-pass-legislation/​. 
85 The 11 members are Congress are: Andy Biggs (AZ), Mo Brooks (AL), Warren Davidson (OH), Matt Gaetz (FL), 
Louie Gohmert (TX), Trey Hollingsworth (IN), Jim Jordan (OH), Thomas Massie (KY), Mark Meadows (NC), Alex 
Mooney (WV), and Bill Posey (FL).  
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of officials who have been elected in the past decade, such as Representatives Alexandria              
Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, Pramila Jayapal, and Ro Khanna.  
However, even if these two sides ultimately have divergent worldviews and hope to             
decrease intervention for different reasons, the one thing that they do agree on represents              
massive progress.“There is a potential for forging a coalition between people on the right who               
don’t like the direction of US policy and people on the left,” says Bacevich, “We don’t have to                  
agree with one another on issues not related to America’s role in the world, but there’s plenty of                  
room for agreement with regard to America’s role in the world.” Intervention and militarism              86
have been embraced by such a powerful bipartisan consensus for generations that any deviation              
from it is an impressive accomplishment.  
Such a re-thinking would also allow a more fully-fledged debate on where to spend the               
United States’ limited resources; resources which up until now have often been tied up in               
massive military budgets. As Gsovdev explains it, there is agreement on both sides of the               
political aisle that “U.S. involvement in the international system must be amended—with a             
renewed focus on how American policy abroad connects to the doorstep issues of average              
Americans.” Although someone like Trump would ultimately spend this money in radically            87
different ways than Sanders or Warren, competing domestic priorities need not come in the way               
of reducing America’s military footprint. “‘Once we significantly reduce the military budget, we             
can argue about how to use the money,’ says [Quincy Institute member Stephen]             
86 Klion, “Can a New Think Tank Put a Stop to Endless War?” 
87 ​Gvosdev, “Can a 'Trumpian' Foreign Policy Stick?” 
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Wertheim—that is, whether the savings from a slashed Pentagon budget should be invested in              
social programs or used to pay for tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans.”   88
Although many may have come to the conclusion that the liberal democratic world order              
ended in failure, this way of thinking reigned for at least three decades, and its promoters reached                 
the highest levels of power, getting to the point in which, in elite echelons of government                
discourse, this view of foreign policy was never seriously challenged. By those measures, the              
liberal interventionist/neoconservative alliance was a success. By putting aside their difference in            
approach, this worldview reigned over the world for multiple Presidencies. If this            
newly-proposed concept of “transpartisanship” and restraint can successfully work, permitting          
these two sides of the political aisle to put aside the differences and come together on the one                  
issue on which they agree, the United States might be able to redefine its role on the world stage.                   
However, can a coalition built around opposed worldviews with only certain overlaps in how to               
get there, ultimately succeed in the same way that its predecessor was able to? 
V: Imagining the Unimaginable: Can a Non-Interventionist Foreign Policy Take 
Hold? 
The liberal internationalist/neoliberal coalition maintained its grip on foreign policy for a 
number of reasons. The fall of the Soviet Union permitted the United States to more freely 
pursue its vision for a world guided by American values and precipitated by American action. 
This was a worldview that was appealing to both Democrats and Republicans. Despite a 
difference in approaches, both sides were often willing to compromise if the ultimate 
88 Klion, “Can a New Think Tank Put a Stop to Endless War?” 
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goals—spreading democracy, protecting human rights, upholding globalization, and defending 
American interests—were met. The factors that created the post-Cold War consensus also made 
that way of thinking very hard to dislodge.  
This full embrace of American exceptionalism, along with the turn towards the military 
as the primary tool to accomplish these goals, left the United States in something akin to 
perpetual war. The trend in the direction of militarization has become further entrenched due to 
the military-industrial complex, bloated DOD budgets that leave the military with responsibilities 
that they (and all other elements of the US government) are unable to fulfill, increased 
presidential power at the expense of Congress, and an inability from politicians to adequately 
express when and how the military should be used. In order to unwind this consensus, each of 
these factors will need to be challenged.  
The above section suggests that, given the domestic political conditions, the status quo 
may be ripe for such a re-thinking. Members of both sides of the political aisle have questioned 
the success of the era of American Exceptionalism, and many of these people have openly mused 
about the possibility of a left- and right-wing coalition centered on a non-interventionist foreign 
policy. The question is whether this moment is a signal—or whether it is noise: Can it really lead 
to a radical re-alignment of US foreign policy, or is it only a blip on the radar that will prove 
unable to replace the liberal internationalist/neoconservative status quo? 
While it is likely true that, as Gvosdev argues “Americans are never going to be 
isolationists—because U.S. security and prosperity do depend on U.S. interaction with the rest of 
the world,” there is still space for accomplishment that does not include populists or progressives 
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transforming America’s role in the world.  Indeed, neither side claims to desire an isolationist 89
country,  instead they seek to question the “the degree and depth of that interaction” with the rest 
of the world.  Will this new coalition be able to put aside their differences, make 90
decision-makers reconsider their impulses towards military intervention, and put forth a clear 
vision of what American statesmanship could look like? Is the current rhetorical aversion to 
intervention a short-term one that will be overcome or can it develop into  something more 
sustained? The following paragraph will address potential obstacles and seek to explore how 
they may be overcome.  
The first problem that arises is that this coalition is largely formed by minority voices 
within their own party, often on questions beyond the realm of foreign policy. Although Trump 
and Sanders suggest some kind of deviation, the leadership of both parties tends to have been in 
government longer and mostly still abides by the thinking of the past consensus. However, 
although, as Lynda Powell suggests—and conventional wisdom usually holds—cross-party 
coalitions are usually formed by members closer to the political system, David Epstein offers a 
theoretical framework for why such a coalition may be attainable, writing “it is exactly those 
majority members with  extreme preferences who most need support from the minority party (...) 
to pass their preferred legislation.”  91
This concept may explain why Senators like Sanders and Lee, who often make enemies 
within their own party, would similarly need each other’s help in order to pass the Yemen Bill. 
89 ​Gvosdev, “Can a 'Trumpian' Foreign Policy Stick?”. 
90 ​Ibid.  
91 David Epstein, “Legislating from Both Sides of the Aisle: Information and the Value of Bipartisan Consensus,” 
Public Choice 101, no. 1/2 (1999): 20, ​https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30026107.pdf​.  
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Still, this bill remains one isolated example in which the legislation had a particular, concrete 
goal. When it comes to accomplishing a wider-ranging goal of re-defining American foreign 
policy, legislation will have to answer questions where these two sides do not agree. For 
example: Should the United States roll back its commitments to defending NATO allies? Should 
the American government engage diplomatically with Iran and Cuba? Should Congress vote to 
reduce the Pentagon’s budget? On questions like these, the populist right’s view diverges 
significantly from that of the progressive left. A 2016 study by D.J. Flynn and Laurel Hartbridge 
determines that on “consensus issues” (where the opposing sides agree on the goal, if not the 
means) a legislative “loss” is preferable to gridlock where on “non-consensus issues,” gridlock is 
preferred to the opposing side accomplishing their goals, suggesting that the public would not 
accept a legislative “loss” on questions such as these.  92
This emerging coalition, therefore, struggles to directly confront the reasons for the 
entrenchment of intervention and militarism in the United States government. While the criticism 
from the left encompasses many of the problems addressed throughout this paper, the right-wing 
opposition seems more catered toward withdrawal without a broader vision of how the United 
States should be engaged with the rest of the world.  
The next roadblock is that, like its predecessor, this coalition does not have clear 
guidelines to determine what foreign policy should look like, or when, if ever, the United should 
intervene militarily. The military intervention of the first Gulf War is widely viewed as having 
92 D.J. Flynn and Laurel Harbridge, “How Partisan Conflict in Congress Affects Public Opinion: Strategies, 
Outcomes and Issue Differences,” Sage Journals 44, no. 5 (2016): 882, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X15610425​.  
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been successful, partially because the United States was able to halt the overreach of a foreign 
country and then withdraw itself from the conflict. However, in more recent iterations such as in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya, it has proved more difficult for the missions to avoid devolving into 
a regime change or nation building project. Members of both the progressive and populist wings 
can agree that these decisions turned out catastrophically, but there doesn’t seem to be an 
agreement on when military engagement is justified. It would be difficult for the left, who 
remain committed to the protection of human rights, to turn a blind eye to a genocide; much as 
many on the right would be inclined to exert the full strength of the military if they thought US 
domination was at risk. Today, the populist right has already articulated that China, the world’s 
second largest economy, is a far greater threat than historical geopolitical rivals like Iran or 
Russia, who have been the bogeymen of the Republican party for a generation.   93
The increased partisan nature of American politics may also serve as a roadblock for this 
coalition. While the established consensus often managed to supersede partisan politics between 
the Cold War and today, a bipartisan coalition formed in a time of such partisan rancor may be 
more difficult to uphold. While public opinion continues to theoretically support bipartisan 
solutions, research shows that, when presented with tangible examples, respondents tended more 
towards partisan solutions than bipartisan ones.   94
Trump’s election has not only increased general partisanship, but created a particularly 
tricky case study for the plausibility of minority members from both sides joining forces. While 
93 ​Rachel Esplin Odell and Stephen Wertheim, “Can the Democrats Avoid Trump’s China Trap?,” ​The New York 
Times​, May 10, 2020, ​https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/opinion/china-coronavirus-trump.html​.  
94 Laurel Harbridge, Neil Malhotra, and Brian F. Harrison. “Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the 
Policymaking Process.” ​Legislative Studies Quarterly​, 39, no. 3 (2014): 327-355, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/lsq.12048​.  
50 
 
Malley 
 
  
some leftists in academia and journalism have half-heartedly embraced Trump’s desire for 
withdrawal, anti-war Democratic politicians have been more hesitant to agree with his chaotic 
approach to foreign policy.  For example, every Democrat in Congress recently voted in 
opposition to Trump’s announcement that he would withdraw all American troops from Syria. 
“President Trump campaigned and won on a less interventionist foreign policy. This has 
emboldened some Republicans to follow their conscience on this issue,” Congressman Massie 
told the ​American Conservative ​after the vote regarding the withdrawal from Syria, “But sadly, 
at the same time, it’s caused the media and some congressmen on the anti-war left to switch 
positions.”  While some of this opposition stems from the fact that this withdrawal was hastily 95
thought out and would leave the United States’ Kurdish allies vulnerable, it demonstrates that 
there is still some trepidation about removing combat troops from the Middle East. Others who 
favor a more restrained or progressive foreign policy have warned Democrats to not instinctively 
go against Trump, fearing that doing so would only perpetuate liberal internationalism as the 
correct view on foreign policy and warning that such opposition may lead to the left countering 
positions that they may have previously supported.   96
So long as the opposition to militarism and intervention is a reflexive, negative vision, 
instead of a positive one, it will be difficult for it to become fully realized. Liberal 
internationalists and neoconservatives managed to, in some way, define the world that they 
95 Quoted in Hunter Derensis, “The Small But Brave Cadre Of Conservative Anti-War Republicans,” ​The American 
Conservative, ​November 19, 2019, 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-brave-cadre-of-conservative-anti-war-republicans/​.  
96 Robert Malley and Marc Lynch, “Beware the Blob: How not to Oppose Donald Trump,” ​Politico Magazine​, 
February 23, 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/the-wrong-way-to-oppose-donald-trump-214818​.  
51 
 
Malley 
 
  
wanted: One in which openness and freedom reigned, and American ideals of liberal democracy 
and capitalism could spread freely. Even one the most ardent advocates of foreign policy 
restraint, Stephen Walt, agrees that “it's easier to understand what restrainers ​don’t​ want. They 
don’t want endless wars, bloated military budgets, and security commitments that keep 
expanding, but are never seriously debated or approved by the public.”   97
The “manifesto” that Walt lays out tries to explain what a policy of restraint would look 
like, instead of what it would ​not​ look like, but his policy prescriptions seems to be a mix of 
progressive goals such as desiring “More Diplomacy and Less Coercion;” conservative 
aspirations like “U.S. Allies to Bear a Fair Share of Defense Burden;” and tenets of the foreign 
policy school of realism, including “Business-like Relations with All Countries and Special 
Relations with None.”  None of these three, or any of the other goals laid out by Walt are 98
implausible on their own, but they appear unlikely to combine into a coherent foreign policy in 
either a Democratic or Republican administration.  
97 ​Stephen Walt, “A Manifesto For Restrainers,” ​Responsible Statecraft​, December 4, 2019, 
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2019/12/04/a-manifesto-for-restrainers/​.  
98 ​Ibid​. 
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                 Section D: Conclusion  
VI: Looking Ahead  
None of this is to say that the current, sustained, and bipartisan pushback against              
interventionism is not an enormously important moment. Even if the only real point of              
agreement between the two sides is to limit war and military overreach, that would represent a                
tremendous accomplishment. Following Operation Desert Storm, “as the president himself          
proclaimed, the United States ​had ​‘kicked the Vietnam Syndrome,’” or the aversion to getting              
entangled in foreign conflicts without making any measurable progress. ​It appears as if, for              99
approximately the past decade, the United States has suffered from a similar kind of “Iraq               
syndrome.” Obama, despite his inability to transform American statesmanship, did not get the             
United States involved in large scale foreign conflict. Even in Syria, when the president was               
under heavy pressure, including from those of his own party, members of his administration, and               
even his own words, Obama elected not to send in ground troops.   100
Trump, for all his bravado, baiting, and escalatory rhetoric, has consistently backed off at 
the last minute from engaging in wars with Venezuela and Iran. The fact that both these men, 
who, despite being complete opposites in so many ways, ran while speaking about America’s 
place in the world in ways usually unseen at the presidential level, is encouraging. At the same 
time, the reality is that their respective tenures as the primary architect of American foreign 
99 Bacevich, ​American Empire, 59. 
100 Ben Rhodes, “Inside the White House During the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis,” ​The Atlantic, ​June 3, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/inside-the-white-house-during-the-syrian-red-line-crisis/
561887/​.  
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policy too often fell back into the so-called “Washington playbook,” indicating the difficulty in 
overturning this entrenched way of thinking.  
Joe Biden, should he be elected President, will provide an interesting case study. Biden,               
who was first elected to the Senate the 1970s, is an embodiment of the Democratic establishment                
who in the past helped craft the response to the Balkan crisis and voted in support of the second                   
Iraq War, and will likely surround himself with many of the same advisors who staffed the                
Obama administration. At the same time, Biden has, at times, demonstrated restraint impulses,             101
and has shown himself to be a malleable politician. While Biden does not represent the               102
ideological shift away from liberal internationalism, if popular will is indeed shifting that way,              
his policy approach may reflect this shift. Biden has also made overtures to the Sanders               103
campaign, in hopes of hiring some of his former rivals’ foreign policy team.   104
Biden’s view of foreign policy—a focus on globalism, cooperation, openness, and 
American leadership—is unlikely to deviate from his predecessors’, but perhaps his specific 
prescriptions will.  While a hypothetical Biden administration may not shift away from military 
reliance, it could nonetheless demonstrate the significance of the movement toward 
non-intervention. While neither the “Vietnam syndrome” nor the “Iraq syndrome” have managed 
to completely dissuade American presidents from using the military as a major tool (Between 
Vietnam and the first Gulf War, the United States still used the military for interventions in 
101 Branko Marcetic, “Joe Biden, the Hawk,” ​Jacobin​, August 2, 2018, 
https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/joe-biden-democratic-party-military-hawk​.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Thomas Wright, “The quiet reformation of Biden’s foreign policy,” ​Brookings, ​March 20, 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/20/the-quiet-reformation-of-bidens-foreign-policy/​.  
104 Matthew Petti, “Bernie Sanders Foreign Policy Advisors Invited To Biden Camp,” ​National Interest​, April 14, 
2020, ​https://nationalinterest.org/feature/bernie-sanders-foreign-policy-advisors-invited-biden-camp-144257​.  
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Grenada and elsewhere. Similarly, since the war in Iraq concluded, the United States intervened 
in Libya, initiated a surge in Afghanistan, and relied on its military to solve problems in other 
international arenas,) they have led to a decrease in the large-scale interventions that have 
represented the most catastrophic American foreign policy failures.  
A non-interventionist, bipartisan coalition appears to have created a strong foundation 
over the past few years. Though this coalition has made some tangible gains, and may continue 
to exert pressure on the nation’s most important decision makers, a transformational moment in 
American statesmanship is more difficult to envision. It is more straightforward to create a solid 
coalition when worldviews parallel each other, and the primary divergence is a question of 
tactics, not of goals. The concessions that either side would have to make for a 
populist/progressive coalition to become an actuality are too great, and, at the moment, too 
hypothetical. The two sides don’t necessarily agree on what the problem they are confronting 
is—globalization on one end, militarism on the other—and have yet to articulate a clear vision 
for what the replacement can look like. Anti-interventionists will surely have a few meaningful 
victories and make leaders think twice before they involve the military in any overseas mission. 
But unless and until restraint advocates directly confront the questions of militarism and 
American exceptionalism, and articulate a clear, principled, and realistic vision to replace it, it 
will not manage a complete overhaul of American foreign policy, and it may only take another 
international crisis for the Commander-in-Chief to reflexively turn to the militarism once again. 
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